Abstract: While the maximin strategy has become the standard, and most agreed-upon solution for decisionmaking in adversarial settings, as discussed in game theory, computer science and other disciplines, its power arises from the use of mixed strategies, a.k.a. probabilistic algorithms. Nevertheless, in adversarial settings we face the risk of information leakage about the actual strategy instantiation. Hence, real robust algorithms should take information leakage into account. To address this fundamental issue, we introduce the study of adversarial leakage in games. We consider two models of leakage. In both of them the adversary is able to learn the value of b binary predicates about the strategy instantiation. In one of the models these predicates are selected after the decision-maker announces its probabilistic algorithm and in the other one they are decided in advance. We give tight results about the effects of adversarial leakage in general zero-sum games with binary payoffs as a function of the level of leakage captured by b in both models. We also compare the power of adversarial leakage in the two models and the robustness of the original maximin strategies of games to adversarial leakage. Finally, we study the computation of optimal strategies for adversarial leakage models. Together, our study introduces a new framework for robust decision-making, and provides rigorous fundamental understanding of its properties.
Introduction
Decision-Making lies in the foundations of fields such as Economics, Operations Research, and Artificial Intelligence. The question of what should be the action to be taken by a decision-maker when facing an uncertain environment, potentially consisting of other decision makers, is a fundamental problem which led to a wide variety of models and solutions. The only type of situations for which this question got an agreed-upon answer is in the context of two-player zero-sum games. This setting can model any situation in which a decision-maker aims at maximizing his guaranteed payoff. When mixed strategies are allowed, such desired behavior, termed an agent's maximin (or safety level) strategy, leads to a well defined expected payoff (known as the value of the game). Moreover, when presented explicitly in a matrix form, the computation of a maximin strategy is polynomial (by solving a linear program). Various equilibrium concepts have been considered in the game-theoretic literature, but none of them provides a prescriptive advice to a decision-maker which will be as acceptable as the maximin strategy solution in adversarial settings. Since the introduction of the study of two-person zero-sum games [17] , maximin strategies have received very little criticism (see [5] for an exception). Moreover, the safety level strategy has been advocated for some non zero-sum settings as well (see [15] , following observations by [4] ).
Much of the power of a maximin strategy is associated with the use of mixed strategies, a.k.a. randomized algorithms. In such algorithms the randomization phase is assumed to be done in a private manner by the decision-maker, and no information about the instantiation selected in that phase is assumed to be revealed. In reality, however, nothing is really private; for example, competitors will always strive to obtain the private actions of a business, possibly by means of industrial espionage [12] ; hence, information leakage should be considered. As a result, it may be of interest to study the effects of adversarial leakage, where a limited amount of information on an agent's instantiation of its mixed strategy may leak in an adversarial manner. We believe that only by considering this situation, it will be possible to construct robust strategies when acting in an adversarial setting.
Information leakage appeared in game theory in the context of conditioning a player's strategy about the other player's strategy [10, 16] ; however that work did not consider the leakage of mixed strategy instantiations nor its effects on designing robust algorithms in adversarial settings taking information leakage into account. Other papers whose focus is related to information leakage studied purchasing noisy information [14] , partial exposure in games with many players [6] , and spies in matrix games [13] .
Our model of adversarial leakage is general. We consider a two-player zero-sum game in strategic form (a.k.a. matrix form), where the MAX player is our decision-maker and the MIN player is the adversary. Both MAX and MIN have a set of (pure) strategies they can choose from. MAX chooses a mixed strategy, that is, a distribution vector over its pure strategies. MIN may base its action on the value of b binary predicates defined on MAX' pure strategies; each such predicate is a Boolean formula on the set of strategies whose value is determined according to the actual instantiation of MAX' mixed strategy. The parameter b can be thought of as the amount of information leakage (or number of leaking bits) regarding the instance of MAX' mixed strategy; MAX would like to maximize his guaranteed expected payoff against such b binary predicates.
We consider two settings, distinguished by the information structure assumed in them. In the Strong Model the MAX player chooses a mixed strategy, which is observable by the MIN player, who can then act upon it in determining the b predicates. In the Weak Model, on the other hand, the MIN player chooses the b predicates first, and MAX can observe it and act upon it in choosing his mixed strategy.
Note that by von Neumann's minimax theorem, if MIN is allowed to choose the b predicates probabilistically, then the Weak Model becomes equivalent to the Strong Model in terms of the value that MAX (and MIN) can guarantee. However, the information structure in the Weak Model is such that MIN is restricted to deterministically choosing the b predicates. This clearly provides MAX with a potential advantage and we are interested in understanding and quantifying this advantage.
Other intriguing questions arise in this setting of adversarial leakage. What would be the best mixed strategy for the MAX player? How well will the original maximin strategy of the game perform? What is the computational complexity of finding the optimal strategy under information leakage? We address all these questions, focusing our attention on general two-person games, where the decision-maker has m strategies to choose from, the adversary has n strategies to choose form, and the payoffs to the decision maker are either 1 or 0. This is known to be a highly applicable model, as it captures games in which a goal is either achieved or not. Somewhat surprisingly, once the number of leaking bits is slightly larger, that is, b = log log m+ O(1), the MIN player can already ensure value 0 in any game with a fixed value q < 1. Thus, in the examples above a sharp transition occurs at nearly b = log log m under the Weak Model: nearly log log m bits have essentially no effect on the value, while slightly more bits already suffice to drop the value to 0.
Note that, in contrast to leakage-free settings, where no advantage is gained by observing the opponent's mixed strategy (due to the minimax theorem), in settings of adversarial leakage, such information can contribute a great deal to the informed player, reflected by the advantage obtained by MAX in the Weak Model compared with the Strong Model.
With respect to computation complexity, computing the optimal strategy in the Strong Model (for the MAX player) against b leaking bits is poly-time for any fixed b, while this problem becomes NP-hard to compute, or even to approximate within any factor, for a general b. In the Weak Model, the optimal strategy of MAX can be computed in polynomial time for every b.
Model
We consider two-player zero-sum games defined by an m by n matrix M with {0, 1} entries, where the rows correspond to MAX' pure strategies and the columns correspond to MIN's pure strategies: M i,j is the payoff of MAX if MAX and MIN play row i and column j, respectively (the payoff of MIN is then −M i,j ).
1 The matrix M is known to both players.
Given a matrix M and an integer b ≥ 0, we describe a precise setting of adversarial leakage, as follows: (1) It will be convenient to formalize the choice of (pure) strategy made by MIN in step (3) as a function
. Note that MIN decides on g when it already knows the mixed strategy p of MAX. This is less important under the Strong Model, where it can be assumed that MIN chooses g simultaneously with its choice of f . However, under the Weak Model, the choice of g must be made at a later stage (when MIN already knows p).
Given a matrix M , a non-negative integer b, a dis-
and a function g :
denote the expected payoff of MAX (with respect to these parameters). Denote
The value of M against b leaking bits under the Strong Model is defined as
When the leakage model is clear from the context, we may omit the superscripts and write simply v(M, b).
Observe that under this notation, v(M, 0) is the classical value of (the game defined by) M . Unless otherwise specified, all logarithms are in base 2.
Adversarial Leakage in the Strong Model
We first show that for any m by n matrix with {0, 1} entries of value q = 1 − , the MAX player can guarantee herself at least a payoff of 1 − 2 b . This can be done, in particular, by playing the maximin strategy. 
= w}, and let p w = i∈S w p i . Fix some column j. Since 1 − is the value of the game, it holds that for every w, i∈S
w and rearranging the last inequality yields
The expected payoff of MAX is given by the ex- (w) and the expected payoff of MAX conditioned on the event that some row i ∈ S w is played is given by the expression
, which is at least
Equation (1). Therefore the expected payoff of MAX is at least w∈{0,1} b p
The above bound is tight, as established in the following proposition. (2) 
Proof. Let n = 1/ and consider the n by n matrix M in which M i,i = 0 for every i, and M i,j = 1 for every i = j. From symmetry considerations, both the maximin strategy and the optimal strategy against b leaking bits is the uniform distribution over the rows. Let f be a function which imposes the following partition on the rows: each one of the first 2 b − 1 rows constitutes its own subset, and the remaining rows constitute the last subset. In this case, if one of the first 2 b − 1 rows is chosen (each with probability ), then MAX' payoff is 0, while if one of the remaining rows is chosen (with a total probability of 1 − (2 b − 1) ), then the payoff obtained by the MAX player is
. The expected payoff of the MAX player is therefore
The above two propositions essentially say that for games with value q = 1− and b such that 2
MAX can guarantee a payoff of about q 2 b by playing the maximin strategy, and this is optimal. The case of general q and b, however, requires more work, and this is the focus of the following statement. Proof. Put p (1) = p, and let j 1 ∈ [n] be a pure strategy of MIN (a column of M) ensuring a value of q 1 ≤ q against the mixed strategy p (1) of MAX. Such a pure strategy must exist since q is the value of the game.
Let p (2) be the distribution vector defined by restricting p (1) to the rows in [m] − S 1 , namely,
o t h e r w i s e .
Let j 2 be a pure strategy of MIN ensuring a value of q 2 ≤ q against the mixed strategy p (2) of MAX. Once again, such a pure strategy must exist since q is the value of the game. Define 
The above construction guarantees that when MAX plays according to p, and MIN follows f and g, the payoff is 1 with probability at most
As a corollary of Theorem 3.3, we get the following. 
Remark:
The corollary is essentially the known simple fact (proved in [7] , [9] ) that the ratio between the fractional cover and the integer cover of a hypergraph with m edges is at most ln m.
The following theorem shows that both Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 are essentially tight. 
by Theorem 3.3).
In particular, for, say, m = n 2 and b ≤ log log m −
Proof. Let M be a random m by n matrix with {0, 1}-entries obtained by choosing each entry M i,j , randomly and independently, to be 1 with probability q and 0 with probability 1−q. We show that M satisfies the assertion of the theorem with positive probability.
Since m, n are large and are polynomially related, almost surely (that is, with probability that tends to 1 as m, n tend to infinity) every row of M has (1 ± o(1))qn 1-entries, and every column of M has (1 ± o(1))qm 1 entries. This follows easily by the standard known estimates for Binomial distributions, see, for example, [3] . This implies that the value of the game is (1 ± o(1))q: indeed, if MAX (respectively, MIN) plays according to the uniform distribution on the rows (resp., columns), then it guarantees an expected payoff of at least (resp., at most) (1 ± o(1))q. Thus (i) holds almost surely.
We establish the assertion by showing that (ii) holds with high probability as well. For that purpose, we argue that for every choice of a set J ⊂ 
Remark:
The proof of existence of M as in the last theorem is probabilistic. In the appendix we give similar explicit examples using either finite geometries, or character sum estimates (Weil's Theorem [18] ), or any example of small sample spaces supporting nearly 2 bwise independent random variables. See [11] or [1] for some such examples.
Adversarial Leakage in the Weak Model
The following result deals with the Weak Model. It shows that in sharp contrast to the situation with the Strong Model, here there are examples in which log log m − O(1) bits of information do not enable the MIN player to gain any significant advantage. 
there is an m by n matrix M with {0, 1}-entries so that the value of the game it determines v(M, 0) is q + o(1), and v
In particular, if m = n 2 and b = log log m − Θ(1),
The proof of the above theorem is more complicated than the ones in the previous section, and requires several preparations. We need the following known result.
Lemma 4.2 ([2], Lemma 3.2). Let Y be a random variable with expectation E[Y
Using the above lemma, we prove the following. Lemma 4.3. Let q be a real, 0 < q < 1, and let p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) be a distribution vector on [n] , that is, p j ≥ 0 for all j and j p j = 1. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be independent, identically distributed indicator random variables, where each X j is 1 with probability q (and 0 with probability 1 − q.) Define X = n j=1 X j p j . Then the probability that X is at least its expectation (which is q) is bigger than
, and E[Y ] = 0. In order to apply the previous lemma, we compute the variance of Y , and estimate its forth moment.
The desired result now follows from Lemma 4.2, (using the fact that 2 4/3 · 3 < 10).
Remark: For q ≤ 1/2 the estimate in the lemma is tight, up to a constant factor. Indeed, for p = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) the probability that X is at least q is precisely the probability that X 1 = 1, which is q. For q = 1/k with k being an integer there is a simpler argument showing that in this case the probability that X is at least its expectation is at least q (which is precisely tight). The idea is to choose the random vector (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) by first choosing, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, a random uniform number n j in {1, 2, , . . . , k} with all choices being independent, and then by selecting a uniform random Z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, defining X j to be 1 iff n j = Z. Since the sum Z∈ [k] ( j:nj =Z p j ) = 1, it follows that for each choice of the values n j , there is at least one Z so that j:nj =Z p j ≥ 1/k, and therefore the probability that the obtained random sum is at least q = 1/k is at least 1/k, as claimed. Note that for some values of q the probability that X is at least q is strictly smaller than q. Indeed, for example, if q = 0.501 and the vector p is (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, . . . , 0), then the probability that X is at least q is the probability that X 1 = X 2 = 1, which is q 2 , that is, roughly q/2.
Corollary 4.4. Let v be a random vector of length
n with {0, 1} entries obtained by selecting each entry, randomly and independently, to be 1 with probability q, and 0 with probability 1−q. Let P be any fixed set of distribution vectors of length n. Then, the probability that the inner product of the vector v with each of the vectors p ∈ P is at least q, is at least ((1−q) 
)
|P| .
Proof. By the FKG Inequality (c.f., e.g., [3] , Chapter 6.), the probability that the inner product of v with each of the vectors p ∈ P is at least q is greater or equal to the product of these probabilities. But according to Lemma 4.3, for every p ∈ P, the probability that the inner product of v with p is at least q is greater than
10 . The desired result follows. We are now ready to state the proof of Theorem 4.1:
Proof. (sketch) Take a δ-net N of distributions of length n with respect to the 1 -norm. Apply the last lemma to every set P of 2 b of them to conclude, using the union bound, that almost surely for every such set there is a pure strategy of the MAX player that ensures her value at least q with respect to each of these mixed strategies. Here we use the fact that |N | ≤ [( Somewhat surprisingly, even in the Weak Model, although there are examples in which the MIN player cannot decrease the value by much using at most log log m − O(1) bits of information, if he is allowed to use log log m + O(1) bits, he can always decrease the value to 0. This is described in the next (simple) result, which, together with the previous theorem, exhibits an unexpected sharp phase transition at b = log log m. 
Optimal Strategy Computation
We begin with a simple example of a {0, 1} matrix M with a maximin strategy p * 0 that satisfies (i) Table 1 . The main ingredient in the construction is a 7 by 7 matrix T 7 with {0, 1} entries that satisfies the following properties: (1) every row and every column of T 7 contains exactly 3 1-entries; and (2) We now turn to consider the computational complexity of finding the optimal strategy for the MAX player in the Strong Model. The following theorem shows that computing the optimal strategy against b bits is poly-time for any fixed b. Proof. An optimal strategy p * b = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) can be computed by solving the following linear program: 
whose size is polynomial as long as b is a constant.
We next show that for general b, computing the optimal strategy against b bits is NP-hard. Moreover, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal value by any factor. Proof. We show that given an m by n matrix M with {0, 1} entries and some b ≥ 0, it is NP-hard to decide whether v(M, b) > 0. This is done by reduction from set cover (SC). An instance of SC is composed of a finite set of elements U = {1, . . . , m}, a collection C = {C 1 , . . . , C r } of subsets of U and an integer k. The question is whether there is a subcollection C ⊆ C, |C | ≤ k, such that every element in U belongs to at least one member of C .
Given an instance of SC, U, C, k , we construct the following instance of our problem. Let M be a binary matrix with m = |U | rows and n = r columns such that M i,j = 0 ⇔ i ∈ C j . Fix b = log k. We show that there is a set cover of size at most k if and only if v(M, b) = 0. Sufficiency: Suppose the size of the set cover is greater than k. Then, we show that taking the uniform distribution over the whole action set (i.e. setting p i = Finally, we consider the computational complexity of finding the optimal f function for the MIN player in the Weak Model. For a general b, the exact same reduction from Set Cover, presented in the proof of Theorem 5.2, shows that computing the optimal f function is NP-hard and that it is NP-hard to find an f function that approximates the optimal value (for the MIN player) within any factor. The computational complexity of computing the optimal f function for a fixed b is still open.
